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SAME-SEX REGISTERED PARTNERSHIPS – A RIGHT TO BE 
RECOGNISED? 
 
Across Europe, the legal recognition of same-sex relationships has changed 
tremendously. Of the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe, 26 countries 
currently recognise same-sex relationships, whether through marriage or registered 
partnership. Italy, however, remains the only founding member of that organisation 
that does not provide any formal system for the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships. 
 
In Oliari and others v Italy (Applications nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11) 21
st
 July 2015, 
six applicants challenged this position, arguing that the absence of legislation 
permitting same-sex marriage or any other type of civil union constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation thereby violating Articles 8, 12 and 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicants contended that even 
if the State was unprepared to recognise same-sex marriage, there was a strong 
imperative for a ‘solemn juridical institution, based on public commitment’ (at [107]). 
Existing piecemeal protections such as regional Civil Union Registers did not bestow 
relevant legal rights and were in any event administrative acts only available in a 
fraction of municipalities. Cohabitation agreements, regulated by legislation from 
2013, also failed to bring ‘social legitimacy and acceptance’ (at [116]). 
 
The Italian Government’s argument for failing to legislate was not based on a desire 
to protect the traditional family. Rather, Italy sought to benefit from a wide margin of 
appreciation in relation not only to understanding but also responding to the ‘changed 
common sense of the community’ (at [122]). That response was already underway as 
at the time of the judgment the Italian Parliament was looking at the issue of 
registered partnerships. In the meantime, it was argued that Italy did recognise same-
sex relationships through the Civil Unions Registers and judicial developments 
providing for equal treatment in specific contexts, decided on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The Strasbourg Court reiterated that Article 8 encompasses both negative and positive 
obligations with the latter helping to ‘ensure effective respect for rights protected by 
Article 8’ (at [159]). Of crucial importance here was the balancing of the community 
interest with that of the individual. When determining the content of this positive 
obligation, the Court found that it must look at the ‘discordance between social reality 
and law’, the ‘coherence of administrative and legal practices’ and the impact the 
obligation would have on the State (at [161]). When implementing this obligation, a 
State, it was noted, would be afforded a margin of appreciation that would be narrow 
if the issue related to a ‘particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or 
identity’ (at [162]). Conversely, this margin would be much wider where there was no 
consensus among Member States or the issue raised sensitive, moral or ethical issues. 
Therefore, the central issue in Oliari was to determine whether Italy had failed to 
comply with its positive obligation to respect private and family life through the 
provision of a legal framework that would recognise and protect the applicants’ 
relationships. 
 
In finding a violation of Article 8, the Court emphasised the need for both recognition 
and protection of same-sex relationships. Pre-existing protections such as local 
registers had ‘merely symbolic value’ (at [168]) and cohabitation contracts were 
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insufficient as they were open to anyone that was cohabiting rather than to couples in 
a committed, intimate relationship (furthermore, since Vallianatos and others v 
Greece (Application nos. 2931/09 and 32684/09) (2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 12 at [73], 
cohabitation was not deemed to be a prerequisite for finding the existence of a stable 
union). Indeed, the Court noted that individuals in Italy were at a disadvantage by 
having some rights recognised but often only after lengthy litigation within an 
‘overburdened justice system’ (at [171]). A registered partnership scheme granting 
core rights would therefore cater for an important ‘social need’ by bridging the gap 
between reality and the law whilst at the same time not constituting a burden on the 
Italian state (at [173]).  
 
In attempting to justify the interference under Article 8(2), Italy had also failed to 
identify a community interest that could be balanced against the ‘momentous’ 
interests of the applicants (at [185]). By not acknowledging national polls supporting 
same-sex rights, movements within the wider international community and the 
repeated calls for recognition even by the Italian Constitutional Court, Italy had failed 
in its positive obligation to provide a specific legal framework for same-sex 
relationships. Having found a violation under Article 8, the Court felt it unnecessary 
to analyse a violation of Article 8 read in conjunction with Article 14.  
 
Oliari reveals a bold court recognising the importance and value of State ratification 
of an interpersonal relationship. When combined with the earlier decision in 
Vallianatos, Oliari undoubtedly increases the scope for same-sex relationships to be 
effectively protected under the Convention. However, despite representing a positive 
development, there are some caveats embedded within the Court’s analytical 
approach that, to an extent, carve back the reach of the decision. Thus three points of 
note arise from this decision.  
 
First, the creation of a positive obligation to provide a substantive registered 
partnership scheme for same-sex couples is perhaps the most striking aspect of Oliari. 
After calls in 2000 for the introduction of registered partnerships by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Court intimated that a positive obligation was 
now the most effective way of ensuring respect for same-sex relationships. This 
readiness to develop this new positive obligation in Oliari is reminiscent of Marckx v 
Belgium (Application No. 6833/74) (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 330 where the clear 
disadvantage to the applicant, in contrast to the lesser interest of the State in 
protecting the traditional family, justified its creation (see W. Pintens and J.M. 
Scherpe, ‘The Marckx Case: A “Whole Code of Family Law”? in S. Gilmore, J. 
Herring, and R. Probert, Landmark Cases in Family Law (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon 2011)). However, it could be argued that by using a positive obligation route 
rather than an analysis using Article 8 read in conjunction with 14, the Court missed 
the opportunity to analyse both the discrimination faced by the applicants and any 
arguments justifying that discrimination advanced by the State (as undertaken in 
Vallianatos). Furthermore, the positive obligation’s realisation will be highly 
dependent upon the nebulous notion of respect. This feature of Article 8 allows it to 
develop in response to societal change but, as the Court noted, respect was not ‘clear-
cut’ and its meaning could vary in light of a diversity of practices in States (at [161]). 
 
Secondly, Oliari compels Italy to act but for other Member States it appears that both 
the scope of the positive obligation under Article 8(1) and the breadth of the margin 
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of appreciation could be heavily dependent on several factors. This point was noted in 
the separate Concurring Opinion of Judge Mahoney, joined by Judges Tsotsoria and 
Vehabović, that believed other members of the Court were ‘careful to limit their 
finding of the existence of a positive obligation to Italy and to ground their conclusion 
on a combination of factors not necessarily found in other Contracting States’ (at 
[10]). Crucially, in Oliari, these factors were: statistics on the acceptance of same-sex 
relationships, the relationship between the judiciary and legislature and the disconnect 
between social reality and the law. Putting aside pertinent concerns raised in the 
Concurring Opinion as to whether such a qualified positive obligation can be 
‘conceptually possible’ (at [10]), these caveats do suggest that the scope of the 
positive obligation could be limited. Even with an emerging consensus of States 
introducing registered partnerships, which the Court felt it ‘cannot but attach 
importance’ to (at [178]), these factors could be used by other Member States to 
defend applications on the basis that no disparity exists between societal attitudes and 
legal protection. Several Member States have introduced same-sex marriage bans 
within their constitutions and, whilst these would not preclude the introduction of 
same-sex registered partnership schemes, they may become evidence to show a lack 
of support for same-sex relationship recognition and thus a state of affairs far 
removed from that present in Italy. 
 
Thirdly, the fact that the Court introduced a new positive obligation may explain its 
reluctance to explore Article 12 and the right to marry. As Hämäläinen v Finland 
(Application no. 37359/09) (2014) ECHR 787 at [96] had recently confirmed, the 
right to marry was exclusively applicable to opposite-sex couples only, perhaps 
unsurprisingly (cf. Schalk and Kopf v Austria (Application no. 30141/04) (2011) 53 
E.H.R.R. 20 at [55]). Nevertheless, the Court in Oliari was unprepared to revisit this 
issue and arguably took a retrograde step by declaring the complaint on this point 
manifestly unfounded rather than merely exploring it and dismissing it.  
 
In isolation, Oliari is an important authority that applies forceful pressure on Member 
States to recognise same-sex relationships and, in certain circumstances, introduce a 
substantive registered partnership framework. Even with the presence of factors that 
could potentially limit the scope of this positive obligation, the development of 
Article 8 in this manner undoubtedly represents a significant move. More importantly, 
combining Oliari with the earlier decision in Vallianatos now offers promising 
potential for much greater formal recognition and protection of same-sex relationships 
under the Convention.  
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